Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment Interests: A Comment on Orin Kerr\u27s The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet by Delaney, David G.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2015
Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment
Interests: A Comment on Orin Kerr's The Fourth
Amendment and the Global Internet
David G. Delaney
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgdelane@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the National Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delaney, David G., "Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment Interests: A Comment on Orin Kerr's The Fourth Amendment
and the Global Internet" (2015). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2114.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2114
68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9 
May 18, 2015 
 
9 
WIDENING THE APERTURE ON FOURTH 
AMENDMENT INTERESTS: A COMMENT 
ON ORIN KERR’S THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE GLOBAL INTERNET 
David G. Delaney* 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, Orin Kerr highlights 
several important Fourth Amendment questions that few courts have addressed. 
But in “offer[ing] a general framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to 
a global computer network in a way that maintains the existing territorial con-
ception of the Fourth Amendment,”1 Kerr’s article focuses too narrowly on the 
Internet, the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient connection test, and the border search 
exception. Such issues must, as Kerr acknowledges, be considered in broader 
context.2 This Essay proposes that courts maintain flexibility to conceive of a 
Fourth Amendment that does not depend exclusively on territory to fulfill its 
twin aims of ordering government and enabling redress of liberty infringe-
ments. It also encourages federal and state courts and legislatures to regulate 
searches, seizures, and surveillance through simple rules that can easily adapt 
to the contours of a rapidly evolving cyber landscape and new government ac-
tivity in cyberspace. 
I. CYBERSPACE CONVERGENCE 
It is important to state the challenges of framing legal and policy issues in 
this area. Kerr focuses on the global Internet. But the real focus is cyberspace, 
which may be understood as the broader integrated networked realm created by 
the convergence of analog and digital networks that support Internet and other 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and Depu-
ty Director, Indiana University Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research. I am grateful to 
Ivan K. Fong, Jennifer Daskal, Craig Jackson, and Drew T. Simshaw for their feedback on 
an earlier draft, and also to Muge Fazlioglu for her invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
285, 291 (2015). 
 2. See id. at 291 n.25. 
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communications. Nations may define the term differently, but national and in-
ternational interests extend to cyberspace, not just the Internet.3 Federal and 
subfederal governments increasingly rely upon cyberspace to perform public 
functions, from waging war to maintaining accurate records. And nearly all 
government activity in cyberspace is imbued with both foreign and domestic 
attributes. Convergence thus melds a significant range of individual and gov-
ernment information and activities into a single environment—a circumstance 
that defies easy analogy to the physical world. 
Because cyberspace brings global threats equally into federal, subfederal, 
and private sector spheres of interest, public and private roles and responsibili-
ties are in flux. When discussing the Fourth Amendment across these commu-
nities and the different fields of expertise within them, it is essential to consider 
how terminology and factual variety affect outcomes. Consider a scenario that 
Kerr offers to propose a general good faith rule: “investigators conduct broad 
monitoring” of “Internet traffic targeting U.S. government computers” that 
“originates from a proxy server routing anonymized Internet traffic from else-
where in the world,” and “the monitoring that occurred would not satisfy 
Fourth Amendment standards based on later-discovered facts.”4 This most 
plainly reads as a law enforcement scenario, but it is presented broadly enough 
to encompass monitoring by other parts of government for other purposes. 
Courts and legislatures must understand those different circumstances in great-
er detail to prescribe suitable rules for law enforcement, intelligence, adminis-
trative, or other officials. 
Kerr’s specific proposal is that courts borrow from apparent authority doc-
trine and find no Fourth Amendment violation if an officer operates under a 
reasonable good faith belief that the target lacked Fourth Amendment rights 
under Verdugo-Urquidez, even when the target is later determined to be a citi-
zen located in the United States.5 Applying the rule in a law enforcement set-
ting, the search would be constitutionally reasonable, the officer would not be 
personally liable, and evidence could be admitted at trial. But there is insuffi-
cient detail in the scenario to analogize to apparent authority doctrine or to ac-
cept such outcomes outright. 
An effective good faith rule for criminal investigators should include sig-
nificant consideration of technical issues and monitoring methods. Regardless 
whether a reviewing court borrows from apparent authority doctrine or other-
wise conducts a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry, key technical issues like 
the use of anonymizing software and proxy servers must be understood in con-
text. These technologies, which may be hallmarks of some criminal activity, 
also provide a means to conduct lawful, constitutionally protected activity in 
 
 3. See Cyber Definitions, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, 
https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (compiling various cyber 
definitions as used in NATO and other nations’ strategy and policy documents). 
 4. Kerr, supra note 1, at 308. 
 5. Id. at 308-10. 
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cyberspace. The reasonableness of an officer’s belief may also be a function of 
where and how the monitoring is conducted—on the proxy server itself, on 
government computers, on privately owned networks, inside the United States, 
outside the United States, as an independent action based on a personal inter-
pretation of Verdugo-Urquidez, or pursuant to government policy and legal 
guidance for monitoring large volumes of Internet traffic.  
Good faith rules may also be appropriate for government communities 
conducting broad monitoring in cyberspace to protect government computers or 
information. Federal and state agencies perform administrative monitoring to 
maintain secure government networks and information.6 The National Security 
Agency and Department of Defense conduct information assurance monitoring 
to protect sensitive and classified information. They also ensure that integrated 
domestic and foreign communication networks can be sustained, defended, and 
used to project force.7 Law enforcement and intelligence officers conduct broad 
monitoring under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.8 While there will 
be some common aspects of monitoring across these communities, these activi-
ties involve different legal authorities, objectives, methods, degrees of intru-
siveness, procedural checks, legislative oversight, judicial review, transparency, 
and public engagement. Courts and legislatures should therefore be prepared to 
tailor good faith rules according to the administrative, law enforcement, foreign 
intelligence, military, or other monitoring activity being performed. 
II. LOOKING BACK TO LOOK AHEAD 
Although the Fourth Amendment operates most frequently and directly on 
those in the criminal justice field—through prohibitions like per se warrant re-
quirements and the exclusionary rule—it also unquestionably regulates all ele-
ments of federal and state government.9 Analogies involving law enforcement 
 
 6. The activity in federal agencies extends from the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act § 202, 44 U.S.C. § 3554(a) (2013) (“The head of each agency shall be 
responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk and 
magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,   
modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the 
agency . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2224 (2013); GEORGE H.W. BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY 
DIRECTIVE 42: NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE SECURITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2 (1990), available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=458706. 
 8. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801-1885c). 
 9. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“It may well be true that the 
evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of the 
pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or ‘writs of assistance’ to authorize 
searches for contraband by officers of the Crown. But this Court has never limited the 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted by 
the police.” (citations omitted)). 
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officials carry great weight when federal and subfederal governments attempt 
to discern the Fourth Amendment’s meaning in other settings—like administra-
tive and national security monitoring—involving cyberspace. But it is not ob-
vious that they should. To help all parts of government preserve Fourth 
Amendment values in their emerging cyberspace functions, courts and legisla-
tures should address non-law-enforcement scenarios more directly to establish 
suitable search-and-seizure frameworks that match society’s dependence on 
cyberspace.  
In the field of administrative monitoring, governments may look for guid-
ance in cases involving “special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement”10 because the function is performed for information security pur-
poses. However, the special needs cases speak to only a small fraction of ways 
that government actors are able to search or seize data for non-law-enforcement 
purposes in cyberspace. Governments should also look to administrative search 
cases like Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, in which the Supreme 
Court found the warrant process essential to protect citizens against arbitrary 
administrative inspections to enforce fire, health, housing, and other municipal 
codes.11 It is unlikely, however, that preconvergence cases can be extended di-
rectly to postconvergence fact patterns. 
It would seem uncontroversial to propose that Camara should apply to 
government inspectors when entering a “connected” or “smart” home to ac-
quire code-related digital information directly from electronic devices and 
communications networks. Present or future governmental interests in acquir-
ing, analyzing, and retaining such data introduce a range of informational pri-
vacy concerns that have arisen since Camara. This drives a need for new prob-
able cause requirements or warrant procedures to address government actions 
in the home as well as future use of data acquired there. Of equal or greater in-
terest are the Fourth Amendment considerations arising from government use 
of cyberspace to acquire the same information from in-home devices remotely, 
from cables carrying the information outside the home, from third-party com-
panies delivering services to residents, from regulators or other government en-
tities possessing the data, or from data aggregators.12 By addressing such is-
sues, courts and legislatures expand the body of law that informs and guides the 
many administrative entities interacting with personal information in cyber-
space. 
In the national security arena a good starting point to consider the suitabil-
ity of current search-and-seizure law is the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in 
United States v. United States District Court (Keith).13 The Court held that do-
 
 10. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 11. 387 U.S. 523, 531, 540 (1967). 
 12. For an expansive treatment of ways that data in cyberspace challenge existing do-
mestic and international legal frameworks, see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Da-
ta, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015-16). 
 13. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
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mestic security surveillance conducted solely within the discretion of the ex-
ecutive is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment freedoms, including individual 
privacy and free expression.14 The Keith Court also observed that the stringent 
review standards suitable in domestic criminal law settings may not be suitable 
for “domestic security surveillance” or “activities of foreign powers or their 
agents.”15 Because convergence blurs (if not eliminates) lines between foreign 
and domestic threats and security measures, Congress and the courts should be 
open to reconsidering these principles. Reasonableness determinations regard-
ing government searches and seizures in the foreign security realm derive al-
most exclusively from executive and judicial processes established by the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act.16 But the secrecy that the President and 
Congress attach to surveillance programs and judicial review by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court all but precludes court challenges of the sort 
that enabled the Keith Court’s clear statement on broad Fourth Amendment 
principles.17 To enable meaningful application of the Fourth Amendment in the 
digital age, the branches must independently and collectively endeavor to min-
imize secrecy, enable broad discussion and review of government activity in 
cyberspace, and articulate clear rules to guide public officials. 
III. SEEKING TERRA FIRMA IN CYBERSPACE 
If history is any guide, the century-long trend in which courts have found 
greater Bill of Rights protections for citizens and aliens is important to consid-
er.18 The king’s soldiers carrying out general warrants are the historical ante-
cedents to contemporary government entities performing public functions 
through intrusive means. As government increasingly deploys law enforcement, 
military, intelligence, and other officials globally to perform physical and virtu-
 
 14. Id. at 314-20. 
 15. Id. at 321-22. 
 16. Exceptions include In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 
F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the search of a U.S. citizen’s home and surveil-
lance of his cell phone and landline during a terrorism investigation in Kenya must comply 
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement). 
 17. In the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures of classified national security cy-
berspace programs, Article III courts have begun to hear a variety of Fourth Amendment 
challenges in foreign security cases. See, e.g., United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 480-81 
(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Qazi, No. 12-60298, 2015 WL 728386, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
19, 2015); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *10 
(D. Or. June 24, 2014); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013); Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
Evidence Obtained or Derived from Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments Act & Mo-
tion for Discovery at 2-3, United States v. Muhtorov, No. 12-cr-00033-JLK-1 (D. Colo. Jan. 
1, 2014), ECF No. 520. 
 18. For a historical overview of territoriality in American law and a discussion of Bill 
of Rights protections for citizens and aliens, see KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION 
FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 241-43 (2009). 
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al searches and seizures, it is appropriate to ask why Fourth Amendment pro-
tections should not also extend globally, first to U.S. citizens and then to others 
in appropriate circumstances. 
Throughout the twentieth century, as the United States acquired territory 
and projected force for national and global security, U.S. courts began to find 
constitutional protections that were unimagined in the previous century. In the 
context of jury trials for crimes committed in the Philippines, Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Dorr v. United States embodies the importance of conceiving of a 
Bill of Rights that protects individuals anywhere: 
In my opinion, guaranties for the protection of life, liberty and property, as 
embodied in the Constitution, are for the benefit of all, of whatever race or na-
tivity, in the States composing the Union, or in any territory, however ac-
quired, over the inhabitants of which the Government of the United States may 
exercise the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.19  
Since Reid v. Covert,20 this philosophy has operated to extend Bill of Rights 
protections to U.S. citizens abroad. The Reid Court found Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment protections for the civilian spouses of service-members on trial for 
murder in England and Japan under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.21 
Regarding Dorr and the earlier Insular Cases, the Court exhorted, “neither the 
cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion.”22  
While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments operate very differently from the 
Fourth Amendment to preserve liberty interests, Justice Harlan’s philosophy 
resonates in instances where U.S. citizens’ Fourth Amendment interests are im-
plicated outside the United States. As Kerr notes, courts are only beginning to 
inquire into Fourth Amendment protections when government agents encounter 
citizens abroad, as well as information about those citizens that is in cyber-
space.23 Given the opportunity for more instances of federal and state cyber-
space activity to be discussed publicly, debated by local governments and legis-
latures, studied by scholars,24 and reviewed by courts, it is likely that those 
democratic processes will yield greater digital-age search-and-seizure protec-
tions than currently exist. 
Until Fourth Amendment protections for citizens are more clearly defined 
and routinely accepted abroad and in cyberspace, it may seem daunting to envi-
sion search-and-seizure protections for aliens under Verdugo-Urquidez or oth-
 
 19. 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 20. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 21. Id. at 5-6. 
 22. Id. at 14. 
 23. Kerr, supra note 1, at 286 n.1 (citing courts that have found Fourth Amendment 
protections for e-mails and the content of computers connected to a university network). 
 24. For a discussion of a technology-centered approach to digital-age privacy, see Da-
vid Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013). 
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erwise.25 But the analysis begins with circumstances, as in Verdugo-Urquidez, 
where the government subjects an alien to criminal process in the United 
States. As the Verdugo-Urquidez Court recognized, aliens generally enjoy the 
same rights as citizens inside the United States.26 The question becomes 
whether convergence and other changes of circumstance prompt government 
entities to approach governments’ extraterritorial or cyberspace activities dif-
ferently. 
In a contemporary case presenting an extraterritorial or cyberspace search 
involving an alien, courts applying Verdugo-Urquidez should consider the scale 
and intrusiveness of the government’s activity. Convergence has certainly 
prompted new relationships between government and citizen since the case was 
decided twenty-five years ago. It is also likely that government’s law enforce-
ment, intelligence, or other interests effected through cyberspace bear little re-
semblance to the one-time Drug Enforcement Administration search of the de-
fendant’s residence in Mexico. This is enough for courts to distinguish 
Verdugo-Urquidez factually. Such comparison of pre- and postconvergence 
circumstances is demonstrated most clearly by Judge Leon’s memorandum 
opinion in Klayman v. Obama ordering an injunction of NSA surveillance un-
der the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.27 Judge Leon addresses the pen 
register metadata case of Smith v. Maryland,28 finding that “the Smith pen reg-
ister and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many 
significant distinctions between them that I cannot possibly navigate these un-
charted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North Star a case that predates 
the rise of cell phones.”29 
Courts might also respond to the evolving digital-age landscape by revisit-
ing the dissenting Brennan-Marshall view of the sufficient connection test: 
The “sufficient connection” is supplied not by Verdugo-Urquidez, but by the 
Government. Respondent is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment because our Government, by investigating him and attempting to hold 
him accountable under United States criminal laws, has treated him as a mem-
ber of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has become, 
quite literally, one of the governed.30  
From this perspective, the importance of extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tions to individuals affected by government cyberspace policies increases as 
intrusive activity and prosecutions increase. Whether the Fourth Amendment is 
 
 25. See, e.g., Douglas I. Koff, Post-Verdugo-Urquidez: The Sufficient Connection 
Test—Substantially Ambiguous, Substantially Unworkable, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
435, 484-90 (1994) (asserting that the sufficient connection test is unworkable and proposing 
instead that the Fourth Amendment should extend to everyone, except nonresident enemy 
aliens searched incident to a military confrontation). 
 26. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990). 
 27. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 28. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 29. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 30-37. 
 30. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 283-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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ultimately satisfied for aliens by a warrant-like process, a different type of judi-
cial process, administrative procedures, or as-yet-undeveloped international 
standards would remain an open question of implementation.31 
CONCLUSION 
Cyberspace enables nation-states, organized criminal groups, and political-
ly motivated actors to affect global U.S. interests differently than in the physi-
cal world alone. Federal and state governments’ adaptation to threats in this 
converged world may be envisioned along a spectrum. On one end, the Presi-
dent and Congress structure and authorize government to act based on the for-
eign nature of many cyberspace threats or the potential for sudden, catastrophic 
consequences. Coordination with international bodies, nongovernmental organ-
izations, private companies, and subfederal governments centers on military 
defense needs. Regardless how likely those catastrophic outcomes are, the Pres-
ident’s national security role is emphasized and central to the growth and appli-
cation of military, intelligence, and related law enforcement capabilities to the 
law’s fullest extent. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the federal executive and legislative 
branches focus on technical, social, and other dimensions of cyberspace threats 
and interests. They structure and authorize government to act in concert with 
other communities poised to identify, calculate, prioritize, and mitigate risks. In 
a converged world, this includes significant interaction with international bod-
ies, nongovernmental organizations, private companies, and subfederal gov-
ernments. Coordination is slower and more difficult on this end, and the federal 
government’s presumed security role may change from service provider to ena-
bler. 
Courts deciding Fourth Amendment cases along this spectrum will con-
front myriad old and new circumstances. Their Fourth Amendment calculations 
require reframing and recalibrating in the digital age, given the factual variety 
and rate of change that a technology-dependent world presents. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has demonstrated that straight-line application of physical-world 
Fourth Amendment holdings should not be presumed when nodes of cyber-
space introduce seemingly slight variations to common fact patterns, at least in 
the criminal law setting. One example is United States v. Jones, in which a plu-
rality of the Court expressed concern about informational privacy interests af-
fected by surveillance enabled by a wireless global positioning system.32 An-
other is Riley v. California in which the Court gave equal Fourth Amendment 
 
 31. For a thorough discussion of Verdugo-Urquidez and suggestions on the role of in-
ternational law shaping U.S. searches and seizures, see Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an Interna-
tional Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-
Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 370-99 (1994). 
 32. 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-50 (2012). 
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protection to flip phones and smart phones found on an arrestee.33 The Court’s 
Occam’s Razor-like approach in Reid and Riley is particularly instructive for 
legislatures and courts contemplating digital age search-and-seizure issues—
simple rules with few exceptions can be particularly powerful and give the 
Fourth Amendment great vitality. 
 
 33. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
